Abstract. We provide the first description of and security model for authenticated key exchange protocols with predicate-based authentication. In addition to the standard goal of session key security, our security model also provides for credential privacy: a participating party learns nothing more about the other party's credentials than whether they satisfy the given predicate. Our model also encompasses attribute-based key exchange since it is a special case of predicate-based key exchange.
Introduction
Two of the fundamental goals of key exchange are authentication and confidentiality. Entity authentication inherently depends on some pre-established piece of trusted information; the most common examples include a shared key, a shared password, or a certified public key. Recently, cryptographers have developed ways of providing more fine-grained access control in cryptographic operations.
Identity-based encryption allows a sender to encrypt a message for a recipient based solely on the recipient's identity (and public parameters for the system); in other words, without requiring a recipient-dependent public key. The identities used in identity-based cryptography may be simple usernames, but they could contain more structured information as well, for example by appending an expiry date or security level. The utility of this idea is limited by the fact that identities must be encoded as strings, and a trusted key generation centre must generate decryption keys for each resulting string.
In attribute-based encryption, a message can be encrypted so that it can only be decrypted by keys whose attributes satisfy a certain policy. Attributes are boolean variables, such as "student=false", "CS department=false", and "Math department=true", and policies are boolean functions. Decryption keys are constructed based on the user's attributes, and decryption only succeeds if the user's attributes satisfy the policy encoded in the ciphertext.
1 Research in attribute-based cryptography has focused on encryption and signatures.
The subject of this paper, predicate-based cryptography, is a generalization of identity-and attribute-based cryptography. Like attribute-based cryptography, it allows for fine-grained access control based on whether the given credentials satisfy a certain policy. However, credentials and access policies can be more general than in the attribute-based case. Credentials can consist of name-value pairs, where the values can be from arbitrary sets, not just boolean values. Access policies are expressed as predicates over the set of credentials, and can for example involve equality, comparison, subset, AND, and OR gates. Existing work in predicate-based cryptography has focused on encryption, particularly on expanding the expressiveness of predicates.
Our goal in this work is to consider the use of predicate-based cryptography in a multi-user interactive network setting, specifically examining the cryptographic task of predicate-based authenticated key exchange.
Contributions
Predicate-based key exchange security model. We give the first security model for authenticated key exchange using predicate-based authentication. Our security model has two security experiments:
1. Session key security: The session key should be indistinguishable to an adversary. Unlike attribute-based encryption, attribute-based group key exchange, and predicate-based encryption, the session key should be secret even from other parties satisfying the same predicates as either of the two original parties in the key exchange. 2. Credential privacy: In a key exchange, it should not be possible for anyone -including the legitimate peer -to learn anything more about a user's credentials other than whether they satisfy the chosen predicate. We argue that this is an essential property for predicate-based key exchange: without it, we might as well return to identity-or public-key-based key exchange with certified lists of credentials.
When restricted to the special case of attribute-based credentials, our security model for predicate-based key exchange also serves as the first full security model for attribute-based key exchange.
A generic predicate-based key exchange protocol. We present a protocol for predicate-based key exchange that satisfies the two security properties above, session key security and attribute privacy. The protocol is a signed-Diffie-Hellman construction that can be used with any secure predicate-based signature scheme. Although our definition of predicate-based signature scheme is new, attributebased signature schemes are a special case of predicate-based signatures, so attribute-based signatures can be employed in our protocol construction.
